The Union, next to our liberty, most dear. May we all remember that it can only be preserved by respecting the rights of the States and by distributing equally the benefits and burdens of the Union – John C. Calhoun
In A Disquisition on Government John C. Calhoun sought support for his political concepts among European solutions that had developed over the centuries. He pointed to the legal and parliamentary results that had been applied in Rome, Great Britain and Poland. There is no question – as Felix Morley said that Calhoun’s argument was both historically sound and strongly reasoned.[1] Today Calhoun – as indicated by the Polish researcher and author of the only Polish monograph on Calhoun, Prof. Jarosław Szczepański – is more current on the eastern side of the Atlantic than in his homeland [2] The current processes taking place in Europe, in the supranational structure that is the European Union consisting of 27 member states, indeed suggest certain analogies with the history of the United States. The particular similarity of the processes taking place can be seen when we reach back to the times of the young American republic and its 19th century Antebellum period. Donald Livingston rightly noted that: the debate over the European Union today resembles the debate of 1787-89 between Federalists and Antifederalists[3]. Many political scientists have predicted various scenarios for the European Union. The pessimistic on the sovereign states assumed that If present trends continue, the different European peoples, daily wrapped up in conflicts and difficulties caused by their own States, are about to be subject to the authority of a continental super-State, without even realizing it. This new government will try to “harmonize” fiscal policies—not to lower taxes, to be sure—and every other type of control of individual resources. At the end perhaps, Brussels will command every political decision and succeed in building a new “imperial” State, alongside the United States.[4]
The abandonment of the European Constitution project and the pushing through of specific assumptions by the Lisbon Treaty opened a new chapter in the history of the European Union. The phenomena observed today include: the progressive centralization and expansion of the powers of power in Brussels, the struggles of political factions, the polarization of societies, the cultural wars and the problem of immigration, the dominance of one liberal and left-wing political trend, the imposition of specific values, political visions and social or moral norms. For now, the European Union is a form of confederation, i.e. a structure from which each country has the possibility of voluntarily leaving, as was the case with Great Britain (Brexit in 2016). From the point of view of economics, it seems, however, that the financial benefits and the entanglement of financial dependencies in the European Union effectively discourage member states from following Great Britain’s path. This type of economic situation is very noticeable in the case of the highly indebted countries of southern Europe stuck in the common euro currency zone, such as Italy or Spain. They will easily be subject to pressure from Brussels.
The situation is similar with the countries of the New Union, most of which are not in the euro-zone currency, but are definitely poorer than the countries of the Old Union.
According to the Lisbon Treaty, replacing the unanimity principle would involve the introduction of a majority system, i.e. pure arithmetic. The voting power of a particular state would then be directly proportional to the population of that state. It is easy to calculate that Germany, together with France, will be able to outvote all the states of the so-called New Union with extraordinary ease. Referring to Donald Livingston’s analogy, we can already say that the “European Anti-federalists” seem to be losing this debate. Losing because the construction of the structure of a federal state is entering a new phase and is gaining political approval from most governments of the member states, not necessarily the nations themselves or local communities. Of course, there are still states that are reluctant or skeptical about the ongoing processes, but their voice seems to be much weaker in the entire structure.
German jurist and political theorist Carl Schmitt in Constitutional Theory, analyzing “union structures”, believed that federal/confederal states either transform into a kind of super-states with political unity, or disintegrate into small independent and unrelated entities in opposition. The European Union does not want to disintegrate. The intellectual and political forces that want to build some quasi-imperial super-state seem to dominate the Old Continent. The European Parliament, like the mythical Greek gluttonous Kronos, following the example of the US federal government, gradually demands more and more competences for itself. Any attempts to resist this, against the deepening centralization and clumsily understood federalization of the European Union, are met with punishments for the “recalcitrant” member states. Their funding is cut off and their sources of money are blocked. Often, it is also condemned to ostracism in decisions at the central level in Brussels, and even democratic elections are questioned (an example is the so-called Romanian variant, or the recent decision of a court in France, which, as part of the so-called first instance, announced a ban on the leader of the conservative opposition, Marine Le Pen, from running in the presidential elections). Revisions to the founding treaties are also proposed, which can be compared to the modification of the American constitution for the purposes of expanding the usurpation of power. The authors of the EU treaty revisions do not hide the fact that they want to abolish the only guarantor for the member states, i.e. the right of veto, in order to completely reshape the union. In this way, none of the member states could block the changes imposed by the EU bureaucrats (Eurocrats). The main goal of the Eurocrats seems to be to give up the so-called unanimity among governments. The EU therefore wants to move from unanimity to the so-called qualified majority. The qualified majority would allow the Eurocrats to push through specific solutions through the dominant political wing, regardless of the reservations of those countries where Eurosceptic trends dominate, so far most noticeable in the countries of the so-called New Union, i.e. Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, etc. Some explain this skepticism of Central and Eastern Europe towards supranational projects by the long-standing influence and dependence on the former Soviet Union. In view of the emerging internal and external crises, the Eurocrats propose deepening centralization, claiming that the entire structure will thus function more efficiently and that the EU structure will be a more important player in geopolitical rivalry. However, this whole process must ultimately entail the liquidation of nation states, dissolving them in some unspecified, utopian idea of a European union. However, the Eurocrats are ready to undertake to achieve this result, believing that it will ultimately eliminate the dangerous nationalisms of various European states, which once gave birth to totalitarian structures and led to the greatest atrocities in the history of mankind. Carlo Lottieri presents this type of thinking as follows:
For the last few centuries, European countries have engaged in many wars, chiefly caused by imperialism and statist ideologies. Yet, these tragedies are often explained with recourse to the notorious Hobbesian argument. For many contemporary intellectuals and politicians, European peoples were enemies in the past because they were separated by the frontiers of independent states. Consequently, they can achieve a peaceful future only if they build common political institutions. In this philosophy, European unification is only one step in the long path toward the political unification of the whole world.[5] The threat that certain things may repeat themselves if the Old Continent is not unified is of course a kind of moral blackmail against states that want to maintain their national identity and distinctiveness. So why does a sovereign nation state have such significance in the European historical context? A nation state is supposed to guarantee the protection of communities. Its existence – as political scientists Magdalena Ziętek-Wielomska and Adam Wielomski note – requires going beyond the level of thinking in terms of ‘me and my interest’ to the level of thinking in terms of ‘we and our interest‘[6]. Only at the level of the nation state is it possible to block the processes that conservative circles want to stop. The most striking example of such a political problem is, of course, immigration from foreign cultural circles and attempts to “quota” or distribute the number of immigrants to individual member states. In other words, forcing all member states to participate in the problem and its solution. As for historical conflicts in Europe, their legacy was and still is a dominant factor between individual states. There is no way to deny that. The existence of the European Union can certainly help to eliminate antagonisms to some extent, but it can also contribute to their deepening. The example of America, its experiences and history can be an invaluable lesson for the nation states of Europe today. Especially when we look at the history of resistance by the states to the expansion of the federal government. The political actions of the American South can be an instructive model for such behavior. The views and message flowing from the writings of the giant of Southern politics, John C. Calhoun, come to the forefront of such a possible lesson for Europe. If nation states are to have some common benefit in being in the structure of the European Union, then the rights of all member states must undoubtedly be respected, and their reservations should not be blocked. Calhoun, looking at the Union of America, saw the threats that are so noticeable today in the European Union. He wrote: To make a division of power effectual, a veto in one form or another is indispensable[7].
Calhoun’s political concepts are still relevant. By creating a foundation for theories such as concurrent majority or nullification, Calhoun points to solutions. On the issue of the fundamental role of the veto, Calhoun seemed to be principled. As historian Charles M. Wiltse says: The concurrent majority is the negative of each interest on all the others – call it veto, check, nullification, or what you will – that makes possible resistance to the abuse of power. Without an effective negative, and this is the only effective one, there can be no constitution at all.[8] Europe is therefore at a crossroads and must choose. There is a similar confusion among the European Right and conservative circles as among true American conservatives and their declarative counterparts. Some of them support imperial projects, believing that Europe will either be imperial or it will not exist at all. Others point to a return to sovereign nation states and thinking in terms of a “Europe of free states”. America, which has already gone through this process in its history and knows how painful it can be, is therefore a signpost for Europe, and the political thought that germinated in the South seems to be a kind of teacher. America can teach Europe a valuable lesson, and Calhoun’s conservative message should be the political decalogue of European nation states that still believe in the possibility of maintaining their sovereignty. If the federalization process becomes absolutized and European states agree to it, then it will be natural to organize the dependencies between states within the entire structure. The balance in the EU should therefore look like this: The European Union would maintain control of the entire structure at the central level, but at the same time securing national interests, in which the central apparatus from Brussels would absolutely not interfere. If this structure is to survive, it must, following the example of American federalism, preserve the freedoms and sovereignty of its individual members. Is this possible in the EU? At the moment, it seems that the Thermopylae of nation-states is the right of veto, which they must fiercely defend today.
Fear of Russia can be used by Eurocrats to deepen centralization and build a European army. And it is not at all about Russia not being a threat, because it still is, especially for the countries of the former Soviet bloc. However, this problem can only serve as a pretext for Brussels to take centralist actions. Similarly to how moods were presented and fueled in America, in its later period, initiating fear of Great Britain, in order to ultimately deepen centralization itself and take away the sovereignty of decisions from individual states. To conclude this short reflection: Representatives of nation states and the societies of these states that are reluctant to the processes that are currently taking place on the Old Continent should reach for Calhoun’s writings. It contains not only a warning and an accurate observation of the nature of political reality, but also a proposal for overcoming political problems and achieving balance within the Union, while assuming that all members of the structure understand their differences. In conclusion, that is why I tell my colleagues, EU-skeptics – read Calhoun! If European sovereign nation states do not do this, if they do not turn theory into practice, then perhaps soon all that will be left for them will be the death knell. Of course, another issue is how to evaluate this problem if all sovereign states governments voluntarily give up their sovereignty. But this is a topic for separate considerations.
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[1] F. Morley, Freedom and Federalism, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis 1981, p. 74.
[2] J. Szczepanski, Political Philosophy of John C. Calhoun, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Journalism and Political Science, Warsaw 2013, p. 15.
[3] D.W. Livingston, The Secession Tradition in America [in:] D. Gordon (ed.), Secession, State & Liberty, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York 1998, p. 22.
[4] L.M. Bassani, C. Lottieri, The Problem of Security: Historicity of the State and „European Realism”, [in:] H.-H. Hoppe (ed.), The Myth of National Defense, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn Alabama 2003, p. 61.
[5] C. Lottieri, European Unification as the New Frontier of Collectivism: The Case For Competitive Federalism and Polycentric Law, Journal of Libertarian Studies Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 2002), p. 26.
[6] M. Ziętek-Wielomska, A. Wielomski, Państwo narodowe i jego wrogowie, Pro Vita Bona 2020, p. 216.
[7] R.M. Lance (ed.), Union and Liberty. The Political Philosophy of John C. Calhoun, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis 1992, p. 497.
[8] Ch.M. Wiltse, The Jeffersonian Tradition in America, Hill and Wang, New York 1960, p. 230.
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